Abstract. The bank supervision in China promotes four instruments coming from Basel III standards announced from Basel committee. What effects will it have on Chinese commercial banks? This paper develops models with a sample of 29 commercial banks in China by measuring risk aversion with Z-score, and finds that: Z-score is positive to capital adequacy ratio and negative to liquid ratio significantly; performance is positive to liquid ratio, Z-score is negative to loan loss reservation ratio significantly. It suggests that the four instruments are good for increasing Z-score, reducing solvency probability and stimulating bank performance.
Introduction
Based on the lessons from the global financial crisis, financial regulators pay more attention to the stability of the banking system and soundness of banking development. However, bank management has to focus on ways to improve business performance. Recently, Basel Committee's Basel III regulatory standards revised require banks to raise the minimum capital adequacy, including raising the minimum common equity capital, from 2% to 4.5%; capital protection buffer of 2.5%; to promote the establishment of buffer capital (protective buffer capital and counter-cyclical capital buffers); leverage an initial period of 3%; the introduction of minimum standards of global liquidity, including short-term structural liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net long-term structural stability of financing ratio (NSFR). The financial regulatory standards will lead to changes in bank risk-taking.
The relationship between Capital regulation and bank risk-taking seems to be no consistent. Capital regulation will lead banks to reconfigure their assets, may increase risk-taking (Koehn and Santomero, 1980) [6] . The risk weight corrected in theory will reduce risk-taking (Kim and Santomero, 1988) [7] . In some cases, banks are likely to become risk-lovers in limited liability, the minimum capital ratio to ensure that banks take prudent actions (Rochet, 1992) [12] . Higher capital requirements reduce the incentives for a bank to increase asset risk, there with reducing the risk exposure of the deposit insurance system. (Furlong and Keeley, 1989) [4] . The latest research does not support the strict capital regulation is negative to bank risk-taking. Capital regulation may not reduce bank risk-taking (Laeven and Levin, 2009) [9] .
Bank supervision always requires banks to maintain certain capital buffer (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Kleff and Weber, 2008) [13] [8]. Short-term capital buffered is positive to portfolio risk (Terhi and Alistair, 2010) [14] . The atrophy in Lower capital buffer of bank loans is larger than in higher (Merkl and Stolz, 2006) [10] . Deviation from the optimal risk weights, limited leverage and risk-based capital ratio is more suitable for control the bank asset risk (Gjerde and Semmen, 1995) [5] . Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) find that the bank's capital has little pro-cyclical [3] . But Adrian and Shin (2009) suggest that leverage ratio has a strong pro-cyclical in sample of six major U.S. investment banks [1] .
As far as we know, it exists that how to incent guard against bank run and creditor. Bankruptcy policy should be matched with a strong asset monitoring for failure banks to strictly limit their risk selection. Incentive compatibility of the banking regulatory system, based on moral hazard and adverse selection, may solve the incentive problem and achieve optimal results depending on bank performance (Nagarajan and Sealey, 1998) [11] . Over-reliance on direct banking supervision is not good for improving operational efficiency. Appropriate information disclosure and private sector monitoring banks, are also an effective way (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004) [2] .
The main innovation of this paper is to measuring risk averse by Z-score with developing models from Chinese commercial banks firstly. The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. The Section II consists of data and methodology. The Section III discusses empirical results. The Section IV is summary. Table 2 , the mean of Z is 107.188, the standard deviation value is 352.3906. The mean of liquid ratio is 19.31806%, and the standard deviation value is19.31806%. The mean of loan to deposit ratio is 57.88937%, and the standard deviation value is7.504933.The mean of loan loss reservation ratio is 2.897273%, and the standard deviation value is 2.48128%. The mean of total capital ratio is 10.09696%, and the standard deviation value is4.156741%. The mean of the mean of non-preferment ratio 3.876977% and the standard deviation value is 4.836691%. The mean of equity is 58158.74 million RMB, and he standard deviation value is 124274.6 million RMB. 
Data and methodology

Empirical results
As the results of table 3, we know that P value is 0.1718, which doesn't reject null hypothesis, so we choose random effect model. Table 4 , liquid ratio and total capital ratio is significant at 10%. Liquid ratio is negative to Z-score. Total capital ratio is positive to Z-score, increase capital ratio, lower solvency probability. However, loan loss reservation ratio, non-preferment ratio, loan to deposit ratio, logram equity is not significant to Z-score because Chinese solvency law is not completed and deposit insurance institute is absent. Notes:*, **denotes significant at10% and 5% level. How does Z impact on bank performance? ROAE is explained variable and develop model. As can be seen in Table5, P value is 0.8126 from the results of Hausman test,which doesn't reject null hypothesis,so we choose random effect model. Table 6 , liquid ratio, Z-score, loan loss reservation ratio is positive to ROAE significantly at 5%. The empirical results denote that more risk adverse greatly, higher bank performance. Greater risk adverse, stable and rational bank could get better return. 
